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Abstract	Philip	Kitcher	recently	argued	for	a	reconstruction	in	philosophy.	According	to	him,	the	contemporary	mainstream	of	philosophy	(in	the	English	speaking	world,	at	least)	has	deteriorated	into	something	which	is	of	relevance	only	to	a	few	specialists	who	communicate	with	each	other	in	a	language	nobody	else	understands.	Kitcher	proposes	to	reconstruct	philosophy	along	two	axes:	a	knowledge	axis	(with	a	focus	on	the	sciences)	and	a	value	axis.	I	discuss	Kitcher’s	diagnosis	as	well	as	his	proposal	of	a	therapy.	I	argue	that	there	are	problems	with	both.	I	end	with	an	alternative	view	of	what	some	core	problems	of	the	profession	currently	are.	KEYWORDS:	applied	philosophy;	Philip	Kitcher;	pragmatism;	reconstruction	in	philosophy;	scholasticism.			In	a	recent	contribution	to	Metaphilosophy	Philip	Kitcher	argues	that	there	is	something	deeply	wrong	with	contemporary	mainstream	anglophone	philosophy	and	that	we	should	“reconstruct”	philosophy	“inside	out”	(see	Kitcher	2011).1	Kitcher	expresses	some	caution	with	respect	to	both	his	diagnosis	and	the	proposed	therapy	(see	249);	he	is	happy	to	admit	the	vagueness	of	some	of	his	remarks	(see	254;	see,	e.g.,	some	passages	on	252	and	254)	and	even	remarks	that	much	“of	what	I	have	said	is	probably	crude,	simplistic,	and	wrong”	(258).	He	continues:	“Yet	I	don’t	think	that	the	errors	and	the	need	for	refinement	matter	to	my	plea	for	philosophical	redirection.”	(258).	I	think	we	should	follow	Kitcher’s	lead	here	and	not	worry	too	much	about	the	details	(it	is	not	clear	anyway	which	of	the	more	detailed	claims	Kitcher	is	more	committed	to	and	which	less).	I	think																																																									1	 If	not	indicated	otherwise,	page	numbers	refer	to	this	article.	See	also	some	of	the	recent	discussion	about	Kitcher’s	paper	at	http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2011/04/kitcher-on-reconstruction-in-philosophy.html#comments.	
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there	is	a	lot	to	agree	with	in	Kitcher’s	paper	but	also	a	lot	to	disagree	with	(and	not	that	much	“in	the	middle”).	His	diagnosis	as	well	as	his	proposal	of	a	therapy	are	both	quite	radical	and	provocative	–	and	a	welcome	chance	for	a	conversation	about	the	state	of	the	discipline.	Both	diagnosis	and	proposed	therapy	deserve	a	closer	look	and	discussion.	I	will	start	with	Kitcher’s	diagnosis	of	the	problem	with	current	mainstream	philosophy	(1)	and	continue	with	a	discussion	of	what	Kitcher	would	suggest	to	keep	as	the	wheat	and	what	to	throw	out	as	the	chaff	(2).	Finally,	I	will	–	in	the	way	of	preparation	of	an	alternative	diagnosis	–	raise	a	couple	of	more	concrete	and	more	relevant	questions	about	the	current	state	of	the	profession	(3).		
1.	The	status	quo		According	to	Kitcher,	the	current	mainstream	of	anglophone	philosophy	considers	Metaphysics,	Epistemology,	Philosophy	of	Language	and	Philosophy	of	Mind	to	be	central	while	everything	else	tends	to	be	regarded	as	peripheral	(see	249,	passim).	Kitcher	proposes	to	question	mainstream	priorities	and	even	to	take	steps	towards	a	“reconstruction	in	philosophy”	which	would	treat	at	least	some	of	the	areas	and	topics	currently	seen	as	peripheral	as	more	central	and	some	of	the	areas	and	topics	currently	seen	as	central	as	more	peripheral	(see	249).	“Central”	is	to	be	understood	as	“of	high	importance”	while	“peripheral”	is	to	be	understood	as	“of	low	importance”.		In	this	context,	it	is	interesting	to	look	at	the	fictional	tale	(248-9)	which	opens	the	article:	In	the	past,	pianists	would	perform	the	works	of	Chopin,	Liszt,	Debussy,	Ligeti,	Bach,	Mozart,	Beethoven,	Brahms	and	Prokofiev	while	nowadays	they	specialize	in	mere	technical	exercises.	I	take	it	that	the	intended	analogy	with	philosophy	is	neither	that	the	anglophone	mainstream	neglects	the	interpretation	of	the	classical	thinkers	in	favor	of	technical	exercises	nor	that	the	philosophers	favored	by	Kitcher	can	be	compared	to	Bach	and	Co.	while	contemporary	anglophone	mainstream	can	only	be	compared	to	third-rate	pedants.	The	point	is	rather	that	the	mainstream	has	lost	the	sense	of	what’s	important	in	philosophy	and	focuses	way	too	much	on	unimportant	technicalities	(more	on	this	below).	One	could	interpret	the	tale	and	some	of	Kitcher’s	remarks	in	an	even	stronger	sense:	
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The	mainstream	has	lost	and	given	up	philosophy	for	mere	technicalities.	I	take	it	that	Kitcher	does	not	want	to	go	that	far.	Several	questions	arise	even	at	this	early	stage	of	the	diagnosis.	Consider	the	diagnosis	of	the	preponderance	of	Metaphysics	&	Co	in	the	mainstream.	What	about	ethics?	Does	it	not	belong	to	the	mainstream	of	anglophone	philosophy?	It’s	hard	to	see	how	one	could	deny	this.	One	would	also	like	to	know	where	Kitcher’s	own	main	field	of	philosophy	of	science	falls	here:	How	much	of	it	is	wheat,	how	much	of	it	chaff?	Apart	from	all	that:	On	the	basis	of	what	data	can	Kitcher	defend	his	claim	that	the	four	areas	he	mentions	form	the	official	core?	For	instance,	on	April	11,	2011,	5:30pm,	the	well-known	webpage	for	online	papers	in	philosophy	PhilPapers	(see	http://philpapers.org/)	lists	92,742	entries	for	Value	Theory	(listing	Aesthetics,	Applied	Ethics,	Meta-Ethics,	Normative	Ethics,	Philosophy	of	
Gender,	Race	and	Sexuality,	Philosophy	of	Law,	Social	and	Political	Philosophy	and	
Value	Theory,	Miscellaneous)	as	opposed	to	63,709	entries	for	Metaphysics	and	
Epistemology	(listing	Epistemology,	Metaphilosophy,	Metaphysics,	Philosophy	of	
Action,	Philosophy	of	Language,	Philosophy	of	Mind,	Philosophy	of	Religion	and	M&E,	
Misc,	excluding	Philosophy	of	Science	with	63,096	entries).	These	numbers	as	such	do,	of	course,	not	show	much,	and	they	are	only	numbers.	But	this	may	serve	as	one	illustration	amongst	many	of	the	reasons	why	one	might	wonder	what	Kitcher’s	evidence	for	his	main	claim	is.		Apart	from	that,	it	might	be	wiser	to	describe	the	mainstream	not	in	terms	of	the	strength	(in	whatever	way	measured)	of	certain	areas	but	rather	in	terms	of	topics	dealt	with	within	what	nowadays	often	count	as	the	different	areas	of	philosophy.	Or	should	we	perhaps	rather	describe	the	mainstream	in	terms	of	kinds	of	approaches	to	philosophical	problems	and	questions?	It	is	very	hard	to	even	figure	out	what	the	relevant	categories	are	for	an	adequate	description	of	the	philosophical	mainstream	at	certain	places	at	certain	times.		But	let	us	get	closer	to	the	“core”	of	Kitcher’s	analysis.	Following	up	on	Dewey,	Kitcher	makes	two	interesting	points	which	should	be	understood	as	specifications	of	the	general	diagnosis.	First,	philosophical	problems	arise	from	problems	that	many	people	have,	not	just	the	few	specialists	of	mainstream	philosophy:	“The	danger	that	a	field	of	inquiry	will	become	a	‘sentimental	indulgence	for	a	few’	–	or	perhaps	a	site	of	intellectual	jousting	for	a	few	–	is	
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especially	urgent	in	the	case	of	philosophy.”	(250)	Second,	mainstream	philosophy	has	developed	a	“technical	language”	which	is	problematic.	The	two	points	are	clearly	related	to	each	other	and	to	the	diagnosis	of	the	loss	of	importance	(at	least	according	to	Kitcher	but	cf.	also	Eklund	2013,	288):	The	truly	important	problems	of	philosophy	are	problems	that	many	people	have	and	they	can	and	should	be	dealt	without	using	technical	languages	of	specialists	(see	250).		Kitcher	says	very	little	about	what	determines	the	importance	of	a	philosophical	question	or	problem.	Related	to	that:	It	is	also	not	quite	clear	whether	Kitcher	thinks	that	philosophical	problems	originate	in	the	non-philosophical	problems	of	the	many	or	whether	he	thinks	that	the	problems	of	the	many	are	already	philosophical	in	nature.	Interpreting	as	well	as	agreeing	with	Dewey,	Kitcher	remarks:	“At	each	stage,	the	philosopher’s	first	task	is	to	recognize	the	appropriate	questions	that	arise	for	his	contemporaries.”	(252).	And,	a	bit	earlier	in	the	paper	we	read:	“Pragmatists	will	think	of	areas	of	inquiry	as	making	contributions	to	human	lives,	and	suppose	that	those	areas	are	healthy	only	if	they	are	directed	towards	delivering	the	things	expected	of	them.”	(249-50)	Some	remarks	further	down	in	the	text	(see	below)	suggest	that	philosophy	is	legitimate	insofar	as	it	contributes	to	the	solution	of	problems	which	are	not	philosophical	as	such	but	which	can	be	dealt	with	with	the	help	of	philosophy.	Kitcher	distinguishes	two	“axes”	for	the	direction	of	philosophy	(again	following	Dewey):	the	enterprise	of	acquiring	factual	and	scientific	knowledge	and	the	enterprise	of	identifying	value	(see	253).	Philosophy	has	a	legitimate	role	to	play	insofar	as	it	contributes	to	these	two	non-philosophical	projects.	On	the	first	he	remarks	that	the	lack	of	answers	to,	say,	epistemological	questions	“does	not	seem	to	matter	very	much.	Inquiry	goes	on,	often	delivering	valuable	results.	It	is	far	from	evident	that	it	would	go	even	better	if	especially	clever	philosophers	settled	these	issues	once	and	for	all.”	(254).	On	the	second	project	Kitcher	remarks	that	value	inquiry	is	driven	by	very	practical	problems	and	that	the	solutions	are	technical	solutions	to	technical	problems	(see	256-7,	especially	the	talk	about	“social	technology”	on	256-7).	One	major	problem	with	this	view	is	that	it	threatens	to	instrumentalize	philosophy.	Ethical	problems	are	in	great	danger	of	being	reduced	to	technical	problems	and	ethics	to	social	engineering;	the	special	normative	nature	of	ethical	
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problems	seems	to	get	lost.	There	is	an	important	question	about	what	counts	as	a	good	or	acceptable	solution.	It	is	such	questions	that	an	instrumentalist	attitude	cannot	deal	with	and	that	requires	some	philosophy	of	the	traditional	kind.	Kitcher’s	pragmatism	is	in	danger	of	collapsing	into	sheer	and	slightly	crude	instrumentalism.	A	similar	diagnosis	results	from	the	consideration	of	philosophy	as	the	“handmaiden	of	science”.	One	wants	to	protest	and	stress	that	whatever	philosophy	can	contribute	to	all	kinds	of	non-philosophical	projects	it	also	has	non-instrumental	value	in	itself.	We	want	to	“understand	how	things	in	the	broadest	possible	sense	of	the	term	hang	together	in	the	broadest	possible	sense	of	the	term”,	as	Sellars	once	remarked	(Sellars	1963,	1).	Isn’t	that	legitimate?	Isn’t	it,	for	instance,	a	very	legitimate	question	whether	we	have	reason	to	fear	death,	apart	from	very	practical	and	even	technical	questions	about	our	own	mortality?	And	what	remains	of	the	critical	reflective	distance	so	crucial	to	good	philosophy	if	it	is	nothing	but	a	servant	for	everyone	else?	Again,	not	to	be	misunderstood:	Philosophy	has	a	huge	role	to	play	for	all	kinds	of	non-philosophical	projects	(hasn’t,	for	instance,	the	development	of	logic	contributed	to	modern	computing?).	But	that	is	not	its	only	legitimate	role.	Understanding	things	in	Sellars’	broad	sense	is	as	important.	This	whole	dimension	of	philosophy	gets	lost	if	one	sees	it	driven	by	external	demands	and	problems.	Here	is	a	remark	that	seems	to	express	this	view	of	philosophy:	“Yet	unless	one	can	show	that	the	more	abstract	questions	do	contribute	to	the	solution	of	problems	of	more	general	concern,	that	they	are	not	simply	exercises	in	virtuosity,	they	should	be	seen	as	preludes	to	philosophy	rather	than	the	substance	of	it.”	(259).		However,	it	is	not	quite	clear	whether	Kitcher	really	wants	to	go	for	this	kind	of	instrumentalist	pragmatism	about	philosophy.	The	alternative	is	to	accept	that	the	problems	of	the	many	are	already	philosophical	problems.	This	is	very	plausible	anyway.	One	does	not	have	to	be	a	philosopher	to	think	seriously	about	death,	the	nature	of	morality,	whether	our	view	of	the	world	is	partly	determined	by	us,	etc.	However,	if	this	is	rather	Kitcher’s	view	of	the	nature	of	philosophical	problems,	then	he	needs	to	be	more	explicit	about	the	criteria	of	importance.	What	makes	one	problem	a	real	one	and	one	just	an	apparent	one?	Is	it	that	some	problems	are	formulated	in	technical	language	while	others	aren’t?	Is	part	of	the	
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problem	that	almost	all	of	contemporary	mainstream	philosophy	is	inaccessible	to	the	lay	person?		Kitcher	critizices	a	“scientist”	defense	of	the	use	of	technical	language	in	philosophy:	Like	science,	philosophy	deals	with	problems	by	specializing	and	focusing	on	small	sub-problems	and	this	requires	a	technical	language.	Kitcher	objects	that	the	analogy	with	science	does	not	hold:	Philosophy	does	not	seem	to	ever	get	beyond	the	stage	of	disagreement	and	controversy	(see	251).	This	might	be	true	but	two	questions	remain.	First	and	on	Kitcher’s	own	terms:	How	can	philosophy	fulfill	its	alleged	pragmatist	tasks	if	it	doesn’t	reach	agreement	and	consensus?	Second,	even	if	one	agrees	that	philosophical	discussion	does	not	lead	to	agreement,	one	doesn’t	have	to	admit	that	technical	language	is	illegitimate.	Perhaps	it	is	necessary	for	other	reasons?	A	more	detailed	understanding	of	a	certain	issue	often	forces	one	to	use	technical	terms	that	are	not	or	not	easily	understandable	by	lay	persons.	Does	that	make	the	use	of	technical	jargon	illegitimate?	Do	further	developments	of	philosophical	problems	always	have	to	be	accessible	to	the	untutored	person?	The	issue	of	the	lack	of	agreed	upon	solutions	to	problems	is	a	red	herring	here:	It	concerns	both	“pedantic	specialist”	philosophy	and	‘broad	brush”	philosophy.	The	question	how	far	we	should	go	with	the	attempt	of	a	detailed	understanding	is	an	independent	one.		There	is	another,	related	but	different	set	of	problems	which	are	more	serious:	How	can	one	avoid	that	philosophy,	as	practiced	by	professional	philosophers,	loses	all	contact	with	the	general	public	as	well	as	with	other	disciplines?	Should	philosophy	be	a	profession	in	the	first	place?	How	should	it	be	“institutionalized”,	if	at	all?	It	is	certainly	true	that	philosophy	cannot	be	self-sufficient,	even	if	one	focuses	on	the	internal	aim	of	understanding	things	in	general.	This	is	too	huge	a	topic	to	be	dealt	with	in	any	detail	here.	I	just	want	to	make	a	few	hints.	First,	it	helps	if	professional	practitioners	of	philosophy	talk	more	to	both	the	general	public	(philosophers	have	a	place	on	the	media	when	it’s	about,	say,	justice	in	health	care)	and	to	practitioners	of	other	disciplines.2	Second,	teaching	philosophy	at	institutions	of	higher	learning	is	very	important	and	makes																																																									2	 Sometimes	one	can	get	the	impression	that	it	is	the	most	grandiose	and	unintelligible	philosophers	who	appeal	most	to	the	interested	parts	of	the	general	public	(e.g.,	in	parts	of	contemporary	continental	Europe).	One	should	never	forget	that	philosophers	can	also	do	some	damage	when	they	go	public.		
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a	contribution	that	is	often	overlooked	in	these	times	of	cutting	or	closing	down	departments	in	the	Humanities.	Third	and	as	a	contrast:	Another	idea	is	much	more	problematic,	namely	the	idea	of	the	philosopher	as	the	kind	of	public	intellectual	who	is	considered	to	be	an	expert	or	authority	on	political	issues.	Laudable	as	Sartre’s	and	Russell’s	political	engagement	against	the	war	in	Vietnam	might	have	been,	they	did	not	have	any	special	authority	as	philosophers	on	this.3	The	question	what	the	role	of	philosophers	or	other	academics	in	the	public	realm	can	or	cannot	be	is	a	very	tricky	one.	It	is	regrettable	that	Kitcher	does	not	go	(more)	into	these	more	concrete	questions	and	problems.		Finally:	What	about	art,	for	instance	music?	Couldn’t	a	music	lover	argue	that	modern	music	after	Schönberg	has	become	an	“indulgence	for	the	few”,	that	music	has	become	a	rather	technical	“language”	for	specialists	and	that	it	has	no	importance	for	the	many?	So,	Lady	Gaga	instead	of	Ligeti?	And	how	about	the	other	arts?	Many	people	do	indeed	make	these	arguments	and	they	seem	structurally	close	to	Kitcher’s	points	about	philosophy.	Would	Kitcher	not	say	these	things	about	the	arts?	Why	not?	A	defender	of	modern	music	would	point	to	the	great	value	these	forms	of	art	have.	The	fact	that	it’s	only	appreciated	by	few	people	and	that	it’s	not	easily	accessible	does	not	seem	to	matter	(or	not	that	much)	in	the	case	of	the	arts.	Why	should	these	things	matter	(or	matter	that	much)	in	the	case	of	philosophy?	How	can	one	ask	“Why	philosophy?”	but	not	“Why	music?”?	Why	do	people	complain	about	the	“uselessness”	of	philosophy	but	not	about	the	“uselessness”	of	music?	Like	music	–	one	might	say,	exaggerating	a	bit	–	philosophy	is	useless	but	important.	Ultimately,	the	questions	are	about	value	and	not	about	technicality	or	indulgences	for	the	many	or	the	few.		
2.	The	Wheat	and	the	Chaff		What	are	the	alternatives	Kitcher	has	in	mind?	Where	are	his	hopes	as	far	as	the	reconstruction	of	philosophy	is	concerned?	He	mentions	a	couple	of	examples:	“Philosophers	of	the	special	sciences,	not	only	physics	and	biology	but	also																																																									3	 Complete	retreat	from	the	public	is	also	no	option.	Helmholtz	was	up	to	something	when	he	called	the	philosophers	of	his	time	“impotent	bookworms”	(“impotente	Bücherwürmer”;	see	Helmholtz	1986,	131).	
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psychology,	economics	and	linguistics,	are	attending	to	controversies	that	bear	on	the	future	evolution	of	the	focal	field,	and	sometimes	on	matters	that	affect	the	broader	public.”	(258)	This	sounds	very	instrumentalist	again	and	I	refer	back	to	the	remarks	above.	Kitcher	continues	and	mentions	political	philosophers	who	deal	with	modern	democracy	and	multicultural	societies	as	well	as	ethicists	who	deal	with	new	technologies	or	global	poverty;	he	also	mentions	questions	of	“race,	gender,	and	class”	(see	258).	Nothing	against	Applied	Ethics,	on	the	contrary:	It	was	high	time	that	philosophers	became	more	specific.	But	we	certainly	don’t	want	to	collapse	everything	ethical	into	applied	ethics.	Applied	ethics	without	normative	ethics	and	meta-ethics	is	blind	(and	meta-ethics	plus	normative	ethics	without	application	is	empty).	Kitcher	mentions	social	epistemology	as	another	laudable	tendency.	But	does	that	mean	that	we	shouldn’t	also	continue	to	do	“individual	epistemology”?	Why	not?	Kitcher	continues:	“Within	aesthetics,	attention	has	been	paid	to	connections	between	art	and	politics,	and	some	philosophers	have	followed	Stanley	Cavell’s	pioneering	work	in	exploring	the	philosophical	significance	of	major	works	of	music,	drama	and	literature”	(258).	Cavell	is	certainly	not	one	of	the	more	accessible	contemporary	authors	–	shouldn’t	that	be	a	problem	for	the	friend	of	a	type	of	philosophy	that	is	accessible	to	the	many?	And	what,	for	instance,	could	be	meant	by	“the	philosophical	significance	of	major	works	of	music”?	Literature	and	drama	are	hugely	relevant	to	philosophy.	But	that	certainly	does	not	mean	that	literature	is	philosophy	or	philosophy	literature	or	that	they	are	the	same	“anyway”	(e.g.,	because	of	the	lack	of	clear	borderlines).	The	relation	of	art	and	politics	has	been	and	is	a	big	topic	in	History	and	Art	History.	What	would	be	the	specific	philosophical	contribution	here?	The	few	examples	Kitcher	gives	are	very	sketchy	and	it	is	not	clear	to	me	what	exactly	he	has	in	mind	when	he	thinks	of	activities	relevant	to	the	reconstruction	of	philosophy.	Kitcher’s	general	remarks	about	the	role	of	philosophy	along	the	two	main	axes	also	remain	rather	sketchy	(see	sec.	4	and	5).	One	big	question	in	the	background	remains	to	be	answered	(by	all	of	us):	What	can	and	should	one	expect	from	Philosophy?	Answers	to	questions?	Help	with	the	theoretical	and	practical	problems	in	life?	One	also	wonders	what	exactly	Kitcher	has	in	mind	when	he	thinks	about	the	specialist,	technical	and	unimportant	philosophy	of	the	few.	Unfortunately,	Kitcher	is	not	specific	at	all	here.	What	exactly	should	we	move	to	the	periphery	of	
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philosophy	when	reconstructing	it?	Where,	for	instance,	does	the	long,	traditional	debate	about	the	ontological	status	of	universals	fall?	Or	Kant’s	transcendental	deduction	of	the	categories?	All	the	work	on	the	Liar	Paradox?	Philosophers’	views	on	weakness	of	the	will	or	on	the	possibility	of	moral	dilemmas?	The	hundreds	of	thousands	of	pages	on	Locke	on	secondary	qualities?	Recent	discussions	of	consciousness	or	intentionality?	Or	about	truth-conditional	semantics	or	the	indeterminacy	of	translation?	Or	personal	identity?	Or	different	philosophical	interpretations	of	probability?	Sure,	one	might	say	that	at	least	some	of	these	topics	are	part	of	other	disciplines	(logic,	linguistics,	etc.)	and	not	“pure”	philosophy	but	on	the	basis	of	what	understanding	of	philosophy	can	one	say	that?	This	move	is	limited	in	scope	anyway	and	cannot	be	applied	to	many	of	the	examples	just	mentioned.	Furthermore,	examples	can	be	multiplied.	Most	of	them,	like	the	selection	above,	concern	technical	problems	not	easily	accessible	to	the	lay	person.	Kitcher	does	not	go	into	concrete	examples	but	I	think	he	should	have:	If	one	does,	one	should	get	worried	what	remains	of	philosophy	as	we	know	it	after	its	reconstruction.	Lots	of	things	dear	to	almost	all	philosophers	(are	they	all	wrong?)	would	have	to	pushed	aside	if	not	thrown	out.		What	remains?	Boring	broad	brush	philosophy	à	la	“Man	and	Cosmos”,	generalist	waffle	or	pseudo-deep	unintelligibility	like	in	some	of	Heidegger’s	post-WW2	writings	(see,	e.g.,	Heidegger	1947)?	We	should	avoid	all	this	as	much	as	pedantic	scholasticism	or	the	fetishism	of	mere	technical	exercises.	Philosophy	is,	amongst	other	things,	an	exercise	in	finding	an	equilibrium,	for	instance	between	waffle	and	scholasticism.	The	difficulty	of	finding	the	equilibrium	is	a	serious	one	and	constitutes	one	of	the	reasons	why	philosophy	is	so	hard.			
3.	Concrete	Issues		In	the	meantime	we	should	also	continue	to	think	about	more	concrete	questions.	What	level	of	specialization	or	detail	do	we	need	for	a	philosophical	understanding	of	a	given	topic?	Couldn’t	there	be	too	much?	How	can	we	tell?	And	isn’t	the	situation	in	other	disciplines	in	the	humanities	and	social	sciences	similar	(perhaps	even	in	the	natural	sciences)?	How	many	historical	micro-studies	of	early	industrialization	in	selected	regions	of	early	modern	Europe	do	we	need?	How	
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many	interpretations	of	some	badly	neglected	author	of	the	8th	century?	How	many	sociological	analyses	of	skate-boarders	in	Seattle?	These	questions	about	the	role	of	detailed	inquiry	are	different	from	questions	about	specialist	language	of	the	few.	And	the	issue	is	not	whether	we	should	allow	for	or	favor	detailed	investigations	but	rather	what	kind	of	detail	is	useful	and	when.	Things	are	further	complicated	by	the	well-known	unpredictability	of	the	consequences	and	results	of	inquiry:	What	looks	like	an	unimportant	detail	can	turn	out	to	have	important	spin-offs	(and	what	looks	like	an	important	question	can	turn	out	to	be	of	minor	importance	after	all).	The	discussion	about	knowledge	after	Gettier’s	famous	article	(1963)	is	a	good	example:	Some	of	it	might	be	very	tedious	and	not	really	necessary	for	anything	worth	wanting	but	some	of	it	has	led	to	important	new	ideas	about	knowledge	(and	the	social	epistemology	Kitcher	favors	has	partly	developed	out	of	externalist	responses	to	Gettier).		There	is	also	the	problem	of	boredom.	Pick	any	topic	in	philosophy	(or	other	academic	disciplines)	and	do	an	extensive	review	of	the	literature	–	can	you	escape	the	sense	that	more	than	90%	of	the	reviewed	literature	is	repetitive	and	not	very	interesting	in	itself?	Don’t	well-known	sociological	factors	make	us	publish	too	much	-	too	much	that	need	not	be	published?	And	how	much	of	the	published	literature	in	a	field	is	read	by	more	than	one	person	who	is	not	also	a	friend	or	collaborator	of	the	author?	How	much	is	read	by,	say,	3	strangers?	So	much	writing	with,	I	suspect,	so	little	reading!	On	top	of	all	that,	we	have	to	admit	that	many	of	us,	most	of	us,	repeat	ourselves	quite	a	bit	in	our	publications.	Who	doesn’t	do	that?	But	what	would	we	say	about	a	painter	who	mainly	does	variations	of	three	or	four	paintings?	Or	a	composer	who	rewrites	the	same	piece	again	and	again?	Why	do	people	mind	this	kind	of	thing	in	the	case	of	art	but	apparently	not	(so	much)	in	the	case	of	philosophy?		Finally:	there	are	questions	about	power	and	influence	in	the	profession.4	Who	can	and	who	can’t	start	a	new	debate	and	on	the	basis	of	what?	How	and	why	do	debates	come	to	an	end?	What	questions	are	we	invited	to	ask,	and	are	there	questions	which	are	excluded	(if	yes:	how?)?	To	what	degree	do	citation	and																																																									4	 One	should	mention	that	the	profession	has	in	recent	decades	become	much	more	aware	of	issues	concerning	race,	gender	and	class	(though	the	latter	seems	to	be	a	bit	in	the	background	at	the	moment).		
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reading	cartels	exist	in	Philosophy	and,	if	they	do,	how	do	they	function?	What	is	the	role	of	fads	and	fashions	in	philosophy	and,	if	they	play	a	major	role,	how	do	they	work?	How	are	traditions	built	and	continued	or	interrupted	and	destroyed?	Is	the	life	of	our	profession	really	always	that	close	to	reason	and	argument?5	These	are	just	some	of	the	questions	we	need	to	ask	more	often	and	pursue	in	much	more	detail.	The	above	are	just	a	few	hints	as	to	what	neglected	questions	concerning	and	problems	of	the	profession	are.	Many	of	these	problems	are	not	purely	philosophical	problems	and	cannot	be	solved	by	a	reconstruction	of	philosophy,	whatever	its	direction	and	content.	Their	solution	requires	different	kinds	of	non-philosophical	resources.	One	shouldn’t	blame	certain	philosophical	views	or	attitudes	for	problems	that	have	much	more	to	do	with	external	factors.	If	one	thinks	contemporary	mainstream	philosophy	in	the	English	speaking	world	is	not	focusing	enough	on	the	truly	important	problems,	then	one	has	to	explain	in	some	detail	what’s	important	and	why.	It	is	not	enough	to	refer	to	the	“jargon	of	the	few”.	What	we	need	much	more	than	a	philosophical	reconstruction	of	philosophy	is	some	empirical	analysis	(by	social	scientists)	of	the	way	the	profession	works.	On	the	basis	of	that	and	of	an	idea	of	what	Philosophy	can	be	we	can	then	proceed	and	think	about	what’s	good,	what’s	not	so	good	and	how	we	can	change	things	for	the	better.6		 Department	of	Philosophy	Swarthmore	College	500	College	Avenue	Swarthmore,	PA	19081,	USA	pbauman1@swarthmore.edu	
	
																																																									5	 It	would	also	be	good	to	have	more	discussion	about	certain	quantitative	methods	of	research	evaluation	or	about	the	very	idea	of	rankings	as	in	Brian	Leiter’s	“Gourmet	Reports”	(the	possibility	and	nature	of	evaluative	comparative	judgments	is	an	important	philosophical	topic	anyway;	see,	e.g.,	Chang	1997).	Given	the	impact	such	types	of	evaluation	have	in	the	profession,	one	has	to	wonder	whether	the	alternatives	are	really	all	worse.		6	 I	am	grateful	to	Philip	Kitcher	for	a	very	helpful	exchange	about	his	paper.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	Mark	Goodwin,	Hugh	Lacey,	Hans	Oberdiek	and	Darrell	Rowbottom	for	comments	on	my	paper	as	well	as	discussion	of	Kitcher’s	paper.	 
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